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Addis Ababa/Finfinee: A Blueprint towards Twin-city 
Administration 
Qabeenyi biyya keenyaa, qabiyyeen qabeenyaa; 
Yookaan qixxee hintaane, yookaan cittee hin baane, 
Akkuma isa durii, akkuma isa durii! 




This article analyses the challenge of Addis Ababa´s double status – both as 
capital of Ethiopia and that of the Regional State of Oromia. It delves into the 
unresolved issue of the special interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee. This 
article propounds that, where there is no separate capital city administration 
directly responsible to the State of Oromia, it is constitutionally nonsensical and 
hierarchically incongruent to require the State of Oromia to join hands with the 
Addis Ababa city government for joint administration. Thus, it seeks to address the 
so-called “special interest” of Oromia in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee through two-city 
administrations. This stems from a critical reading of the constitutional provision 
which calls for the establishment of joint administration of Addis Ababa/Finfinnee 
(see: Art 49 (5) of the FDRE Constitution). Furthermore, the Indian model of city 
administration is taken as a lesson to supplement twin-city administration. This 
article finds that, for the State of Oromia to ensure not only the so-called “special 
interest in Addis Ababa” but most importantly its right to the city, it shall, a 
fortiori, undertake a structural adjustment. 
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Capital cities are arenas of vast economic, environmental, political and cultural 
wealth and diversity – which often benefit a few while the majority are exposed to 
massive evictions, segregation, and resulting deterioration of social coexistence
1
 
(World Charter Right to the City, 2005: 1). While David Harvey calls it 
“accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2008: 12), Fouad calls it development 
by dispossession (Makki, 2013: 79-103). Often, where urban planning is 
undertaken without the inhabitants and implemented through violent means, the 
surrounding populations are often pushed to the outskirts of the city (Erdi-
Lelandais, 2014).  
The reality in Addis Ababa, one of the renowned capitals of Africa, is not far 
from these underpinnings. Markakis notes that where the feudal regime in Ethiopia 
had established landlord versus serf relations, the current label is “investor” versus 
“labourer” relations – where the former is nothing but a “modern landlord” and the 
latter are reduced to “modern serfs” working to win their daily bread. Nowadays, 
the compensation paid to these evicted individuals is scanty.
2
 This fact has led the 
farmers surrounding Addis Ababa to the state of selling out their holdings in the 
black market – still unfair but far better than the insignificant compensation the so-
called investors pay.
3
 Beside illicit eviction of farmers at outskirts of the capital 
                                                          
1 Article 11 of the World Charter Right to the City also provides for multi-cultural co-
existence and the responsibility of the state to “respecting diversity and preserving the 
cultural memory and identity of all citizens free of discrimination of any kind” (WCRC 
2005). 
2
Tsegaye (2016) holds that under the current regime, hundreds of thousands of Oromo 
people surrounding Addis Ababa have been evicted with no or little compensation and their 
lands were given to local and foreign companies. Previously hard-working and independent 
farmers and their children were effectively reduced to daily labourers, guards and 
homeless. This fact generated deep discontent towards the regime in power. For example, 
suburbs such as: Labu, the Laga-tafo, Mari, Bole-Bulbula, Buraayyuu, Sabbata, Sululta, 
Akaki-Qalittii legally belong to the State of Oromia.  However, all these areas were kept as 
the backyards of the central authority in the name of “Industrial Zones”, “Recreational 
Parks”, and “Investment”. See also: Rajac, and Lall 2009.  
3
 See: Proclamation No. 455/2005 on Expropriation of Landholdings for public purposes 
and Payment of Compensation. Although this proclamation was enacted to regulate the 
question of expropriation of lands, it does not deal with the amount of compensation 
payable to collective land holdings. 
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city, the industrial plants in and surrounding Addis Ababa/Finfinnee release 
untreated wastes (in solid, liquid, and gaseous forms) directly to the surrounding 
environment (Addis, 2006).  
Adding to the already entrenched grievances and discontents over urban land 
issue surrounding Addis Ababa/Finfinnee, the so called Addis Ababa Integrated 
Development Master plan was televised in April 2014.
4
 It was aimed at expanding 
the territorial boundaries of the capital city, “increasing the city to twenty times its 
present official size (i.e. 54,000 hectares) by taking over prime agricultural land 
from Oromo farmers.”
5
 In the face of ruling party’s defiance to implement the 




                                                          
4
 The Master Plan was presented as already designed in agreement with the State of 
Oromia; mainly, for the transformation of the surrounding community. In fact, the federal 
government was paternalistic. The Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) leaders and 
some OPDO figures made it clear that the Master Plan will inevitably be implemented. At 
first, the statement was also seen suspiciously and the practice of the state was also not in 
line with its statement. The fact that the declaration of the state of emergency and the 
ruthless measures that followed have relatively winded up the tense state-society relation. 
In the meantime, however, the issue of Oromia´s special interest in Addis Ababa was also 
raised by the State of Oromia. 
5
OSA, December 9, 2015 Statement on the Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master 
Plan and Oromo Student Protests against its Implementation. Even, some of the members 
of the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO now renamed as ODP) also openly 
opposed noting that: “The issue of Addis Ababa and its surrounding towns is not only the 
issue of a city. It is rather about identity. We can raise this issue from several dimensions. 
The Master Plan must promote the culture, language, history, and political and economic 
interests of the Oromo. We know well how the development of Addis Ababa began and 
where it is today. That is why we are saying that the Master Plan should have been based 
on the Constitution. We do not need the kind of master plan that pushes away the farmers. 
Instead, we need a plan that embraces the farmers and their children in the development 
process. It has to be a plan that the local community and the regional government accept 
and endorse” (Translated from Takele Uma´s speech on April 2014. See also: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HVo_9a0nQME (Accessed on August 18/2017). 
6
 In fact, the position of the ruling regime was inconsistent with Article 43(2) and Article 
89 of the FDRE Constitution, which provides that the people have the right to be consulted 
and involved in development projects. In most cases, the citizens are forced out of their 
homes without due compensation and only the lucky ones can get a bit. The case of the 
 
Zelalem T. Sirna  
86 
 
In the meantime, the EPRDF attempted to enact the “special interest of 
Oromia in Addis Ababa” into law as part and parcel of appeasing political 
discontent, and to reinstall its political legitimacy. The draft proclamation was 
submitted to the Council of Ministers in June, 2017. It was finally sent to the 
House of People’s Representatives for final promulgation. Before its adoption, 
however, the draft proclamation was leaked through social media and found that 
what constitutes a “special” interest was not set, the issue of “joint administration” 
was not considered, and above all there was no credible deliberation among the 
public. Thus, the parliament was forced to postpone its promulgation for an 
indefinite period of time.
7
 
Having said, the main objective of this paper is not to discuss the multifaceted 
issues in relation to Addis Ababa/Finfinnee vis-à-vis Oromia Regional State. 
Rather it seeks to address the controversial issue of the “special interest of Oromia 
in Addis Ababa” through twin-city administration. The basis of this proposal stems 
from the constitutional arrangement that calls for the establishment of joint 
administration of Addis Ababa/Finfinnee.  
This paper is presented in four sections. The first section sets Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee as a hub of political fever. The second section discusses the so 
called “special interest of Oromia regional state in Addis Ababa and elucidates the 
impotent principle of joint administration. The third section introduces the 
experience of Delhi and New Delhi administration of India. Drawing some lessons 
from the Indian case it proposes a two-city administration as a way-out. Finally, 
concluding remarks are forwarded. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
“#Oromoprotests” (from 2014 to 2016) is one instance where the Master Plan was resisted 
and the government was finally forced to revoke it. 
7
 The “initiative” to legislate “the special interest” of Oromia in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee 
was secretive and the public did not deliberate over. The more it was kept hidden, the more 
it generated public distrust towards the regime and the draft legislation was finally aborted. 
However, among others, the draft proclamation provides that Addis Ababa shall also be 
named Finfinnee; the past names of places in the capital city shall be reinstated – for 
example: Mercato as Agamsa; Piassa as Birbirsa Goro; Mexico as Chafe Anani; Kasanchis 
as Karsa, etcetera. However, the critics hold that these are not “special” and it cannot 
address the historical wounds and the deep mistrust between the Oromo and the EPRDF 
regime.     
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Addis Ababa/Finfinnee: A Nucleus of Political Malady?  
Addis Ababa/Finfinnee was inaugurated in the late 19
th
 Century through biological 
and cultural “genocide”
8
 of the indigenous Oromo clans, such as Gulalle, Eka and 
Galan. Their homes were destroyed and their lands partitioned among the emperor 
Menelik and the dignitaries
9
 (Harris, 1844). In 1888, the place previously known 
among the Oromo as Finfinnee was renamed as “Addis Ababa.”
10
 Finfinnee, the 
original name of Addis Ababa/Finfinnee, was a socio-political centre of the Oromo 
taken away from the latter by Emperor Menelik II through the use of force 
(Bulatovich, 2000).  
Tsegaye Regassa describes this event as remembered by the Oromo as a 
moment of material and cultural loss, politico-military humiliation, dispossession 
of land, disorientation of one's way of life, expropriation of the means of 
livelihood, and wanton destruction of the natural environment (Tsegaye, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the historical injustice, and the deep division between the 
“Ethiopianists” (thesis) and the “Oromianists” (anti-thesis) over Addis 
                                                          
8
 Tsegaye expresses the reality of the Oromo in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee as follows: an 
invisible, non-speaking, non-acting other who inhabits the interior of the territory but the 
exterior of the polity … the present absence and the absent presence at a time (Tsegaye, 
2016).  
9
 A documentary entitled “Firoomanii Gamnomuuu” by OBS Television. The documentary 
has essential interviews and visual materials clearly indicating the first Oromo 
Communities were, among others, the Eka. One of the families of the Eka community was 
Tufa Arado’s family. Tufa Arado had nine children, namely; Habebe Tufa, Birra Tufa, 
Malka Tufa, Dadhi Tufa, G/Amla Tufa, Oda Tufa, Gada Tufa, Beyene Tufa, Moru Tufa 
and Gurmu Tufa. Habebe Tufa was the first son of Tufa who was given to Emperor 
Menelik at age seven and later became one of the generals during Ethio-Italian war (Adwa) 
and named as Fitwurari Habebe Tufa Arado. Since Habebe was brought up Menelik´s 
palace, before his death, he asked the then Emperor that Lij Iyasu be the next leader of 
Ethiopia. Nevertheless, to this date, there are grand children of Fitwurari Habebe and they 
have given their interviews to OBS television.  
See also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kos7WP7Zopc (Accessed on December 13, 
2018) 
10
The Oromo call their capital city as Finfinnee, etymologically has two terms “finna” 
meaning “gift” and “finne” meaning, “we brought” – together, “we brought gifts!” (Ezikiel 
Gebisa,  2015, speech at OSA Conference). Whereas, “Addis Ababa” is an Amharic word, 
which means “new flower”. 
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Ababa/Finfinnee has proceeded under the current regime without genuine political 
consensus.  
Pre-1991, Addis Ababa/Finfinnee had the status of “city state.” However, the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia constitution, here in after the 1995 FDRE 
constitution, reduced it to a self-governing city responsible to the federal 
government.
11
 The constitution also stipulated that Addis Ababa/Finfinnee is in the 
heartland of the Oromia regional state. In spite of this fact, in 2001, the ruling party 
passed a decision that the capital of the State of Oromia to be moved to Adama 
town, 85 km away from Addis Ababa/Finfinnee; the second largest city in Oromia. 
Back then, the Oromo nationalists in different universities in Ethiopia opposed the 
decision – and as a result, many students in Addis Ababa University were 
dismissed from their studies and many disappeared. Following the 2005 landmark 
victory of the CDU (Coalition for Democracy and Unity) in Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee, the Federal government restored the capital of Oromia to Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee. This was never ever intended to give the State of Oromia its 
rightful place. Rather, replenishing the historical rivalry between the Oromo and 
the Amhara (which most of them were members of CDU) the federal government 
effectively played the Oromo against the Amhara.  
In the last decade, the TPLF-led EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples´ Revolutionary 
Democratic Front) escalated the eviction of peasants from their ancestral land, 
often in the name of urbanization and development.
12
 This fact had a cover of the 
constitutional provision which reads “… rural and urban land, as well as all natural 
resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia” (Article 
40 (3) of FDRE Constitution). 
The proponents of this provision reiterate the historical feudal system of the 
country where the gun bearers and landlords severely oppressed peasants to serfs, 
arguing that subjugating the land to private ownership would be tantamount to the 
restoration of the feudal system. This led to state-driven land alienation as opposed 
to market-led land alienation” (Muradu, 2014: 17). Whereas the opponents argued 
that, land should be privately owned. They argued for the autonomy of individuals 
                                                          
11
See: Article 49 (1) (3) of the 1995 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian 
Constitution. Proclamation No. 1/1995 
12
Among the undemocratic regimes of the global south, and in other parts of the world, 
eviction under the façade of “development” has become a common practice (Azuela, 2009; 
Rajack, 2009; Myers, 2011; Harvey, 2012; Varahney, 1998; Samara and Roshan, 2013). 
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to own and dispose it in any form they deem necessary.
13
 However, Bekele Gerba 
rightly observed that:    
 
Let´s be honest. Today, does the land belong to the people? Does it 
belong to the state? In our assessment, land does neither belong to 
the state nor to the people. Land is the ruling party elite´s private 
property. … In relation to land, our citizenship in Ethiopia has four 
layers: first-class citizens, those who authorize; second-class 
citizens, those who have access to the land; third-class citizens, 
those who watch the drama; and the fourth-class citizens, those who 




In this hierarchy of “citizenship” business organizations or “investors” 
(domestic and multinational) are given priority in relation to access to land in the 
name of “development.” Where the third category are the spectators, the fourth 
group of citizens are those who pay the price, the evicted citizens who are doomed 
to face “landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, 
increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property and services, 
and social disarticulation” (IDCM,  2010). They are those who were once owners 
of the land and now are subjected to daily labour at wages of below a dollar per 
day.   
From an optimistic stance, however, the right to the city opens a space for 
“citadins”, to quote Lefebvre, to take part in decision-making processes. For 
Purcell, the right to the city encompasses “the right to participation and the right to 
appropriation” (Prucell,  2002: 102). Harvey perceives the right to city as the 
                                                          
13
 However, for a keen observer of land rights under the EPRDF, there is similarity with the 
land tenure system under the Dergue regime. For instance, Gemetchu Megersa saw that the 
land proclamation was meant: To mislead the land starved Oromo population with empty 
promises that land has now become theirs. … to give the new Abyssinian ruling elite 
absolute control over the Oromo land and therefore over the Oromo economy, natural 
resources and man power without which Abyssinian political control and colonial 
domination could not be effective (Gemetchu, 1993: 289). 
14
 Bekele Gerba is one of the prominent opposition political figures, vice-chair person of 
Oromia Federalist Congress, and he was a prisoner of conscience for over five years in 
infamous Ethiopian Maekelawi penitentiary. After a series of social unrest and consequent 
political crisis, he was finally released on February 14, 2018. See his speech 
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YY4EuwFNO_8 (Accessed on May 28, 2017).  
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access to power of “shaping the processes of urbanization” (Harvey, 2008: 5). 
Mark Purcell notes that “Lefebvre’s right to the city is not a panacea … it is like a 
cry and a demand … a transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Lefebvre, 
1991 quoted in Purcell, 2002: 99-108). 
 
The “Special Interest” of Oromia in Addis Ababa  
The “special interest” clause was first introduced in the National/Regional Self-
government Proclamation No. 07/1992. Article 3 (4) of the proclamation reads:   
 
The special interests and political right of the Oromo over Region         
Thirteen [Harari] and Region Fourteen [Addis Ababa] are 
reserved. These Regions shall be accountable to the Central 
Transitional Government and the relations of these Self-
Governments with the Central Transitional Government shall be   




Back then, Addis Ababa/Finfinnee was designated as a city state. In the 1995 
Constitution, however, where Harari became an autonomous regional state, Addis 
Ababa´s status was reduced to the seat of the Federal Government and the 
“capital” of Oromia. Moreover, the FDRE constitution consolidated the State of 
Oromia and the Federal government into one space: Addis Ababa. These are two 
entities at two ends of the pole – pulling and pushing each other on the same 
territory.
16
Art. 49 (3) of the FDRE constitution made the administration of Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee solely responsible for the Federal Government. This 
                                                          
15
Proclamation No. 7/1992 of 14 January 1992: The National/Regional Self-Governments 
Establishment Proclamation No. 7/1992. 
16
Let´s explain this situation through the following metaphor. One of my friends, O, loves 
to watch movies, play football, and wants to lead a balanced life. We have a friend, D, 
often so busy, who leads a stressful life. One day this friend of mine said to me, “imagine 
what would happen if D´s body was partly attached to my body … when I need to watch 
movies, play football or have fun; D´s interest to always engage in stressful activities 
preoccupies me … can you imagine how my life would be miserable?!” The author 
perceives the controversy between the Federal government and the state of Oromia over 
Addis Ababa in similar fashion. Unless both organs come to agreement to establish a 
system both can work autonomously on matters that are specific to both, and cooperate on 
matters that are common to them, the problem will remain.  
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constitutional arrangement annihilated the rights of the Oromo over Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee. The State of Oromia was effectively reduced to being like any 
other offices in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee – instead of giving, it was made to receive, 
and instead of hosting it become a guest to be hosted.
17
  
Article 49 (5) of the FDRE constitution provides two fundamental principles 
(1) special interest and (2) joint administration. Under the special interest three 
elements are indicated: (i) the utilization of natural resources;
18
 (ii) the provision of 
social services;
19
 and (iii) other similar matters.
20
 In the last twenty-six years, what 
                                                          
17
 For the purpose of this article, the phrase “interest of Oromo” is used cautiously referring 
to the right to city of the Oromo – as a nation. Whereas, the “special interest of Oromia in 
Addis Ababa” is reductive and does not explicitly acknowledge the Oromo people´s “right 
to city” – rather it depicts as a seeker of “special interest” which this article is critical of. 
However, Article 49 (5) of FDRE constitution is discussed here below for its symbolic 
importance. 
18
 The right to utilize natural resources is one of the special interests constitutionally 
allotted to the State of Oromia. In fact, in terms of natural resource utilization, Addis 
Ababa relies more on Oromia than Oromia on Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, for Oromia to 
maintain its access to any of natural resources in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee, this constitutional 
right should not be underestimated. Considering its symbolic significance, any law 
detailing this special right shall enlist any natural resources available in Addis Ababa 
(which are naturally available for human consumption) – among others: rocks (for mineral 
industry, for construction, underground water, etc.); air (for weather forecasting, wind 
power, etc.); water (for domestic consumption, recreation etc.); land (for burial places, 
parks, etc.); plants (for food, fibre, gums, pharmaceuticals, etc.); and forests (for timber, 
honey, seeds, etc.). 
19
 This is a very critical area where the interest of the State of Oromia in Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee has been totally denied. Here, special interest shall be interpreted as 
“positive discrimination” where the State of Oromia shall receive favourable protection for 
allowing Addis Ababa/Finfinnee to be the seat of the Federal government. The most 
common social services include housing, education, health, water, transport and others. 
20
 The phrase “other similar matters” stands for matters related to the utilization of natural 
resources as well as the provision of social services. If we take the concept of “social 
service” strictly, it may not include “public services.” However, thanks to the phrase “other 
similar matters,” social services can be extended to public services such as public libraries, 
auditoriums, museums, cinema halls, electricity, and roads. Some also argue that revenue 
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form the social services and joint administration should take was neither indicated 
in the constitution nor in any subsequent legislation. Since the promulgation of the 
FDRE Constitution in 1995, there was not any serious attempt to come up with 




The minutes of the FDRE constitution indicate that Article 49 (5) was adopted 
with 507 votes and 6 abstentions. Looking twenty-years back, the 6 abstainers 
were right, since they might have guessed that the provision would not have any 
practical significance whatsoever – thus “yeas” and “nays” would not change 
anything. Zelalem Abera expressed the real situation of land ownership in Oromia 
as follows:  
 
“Qabeenyi biyya keenyaa, qabiyyeen qabeenyaa; yookaan qixxee hin 
taane yookaan cittee hin baane, akkuma isa adurii, akkuma isa durii
!”  (Poet, Zelalem Abera , 2000). 
Literally, our country´s wealth, of ownership, was neither equitably 
shared nor autonomously owned; but same as the past, same as the 
past! (Translation, mine)   
 
Referring to the situation of the Oromo people in the historical past, the poet 
reifies that the reality of the Oromo people, as we speak, has remained the same – 
that is, the Oromo could neither fully own their lafa (land) and biyya (country) 
independently nor owned jointly; rather their fate is being compromised heavily by 
power bearers. More importantly, from the prose one can see the continuity of the 
“accumulation by dispossession” and thus furthering the historical injustice. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
sharing should be included within “other similar matters” (Article 49 (3) of the FDRE 
Constitution). 
21
 Thus, for the last quarter of a century, the federal government has shown no interest to 
genuinely solve the issue of the “special interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa” (Article 
49(5)). It is only when the demand from the Oromo mass protests pushes hard that the 
central government tries to “act.” But, between 2013/14 to 2017/18, the “#Oromo protests” 
heavily pressed the ruling party, EPRDF (Ethiopia People Revolutionary Front) and its 
surrogate party, OPDO (Oromo Peoples Democratic Organization) currently renamed as 
ODP (Oromo Democratic Party); and finally the master plan was aborted.  
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The Emasculated Principle of Joint Administration 
The principle of joint administration is very crucial for the State of Oromia to 
exercise its natural rights in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee. In the past quarter of a 
century, this principle was emasculated, since the State of Oromia had no 
municipal entity in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee. For the sake of joint administration, it 
is illogical to co-relate the Addis Ababa City Administration to the State of 
Oromia. The appropriate approach should be first legally establishing, through the 
Caffe (state council), an equivalent City Administration responsible to the State of 
Oromia. In the same way that the Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration is 
responsible to the federal government, there should be a Finfinnee/Addis Ababa 
City Administration responsible to the State of Oromia. Before founding a joint 
administration, there has to be an analogous institution that could deal with, first 
and foremost, the affairs of Finfinnee/Addis Ababa as a capital of Oromia, and 
second, the special interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee.  
Put differently, where there is not a separate city administration directly 
responsible to the State of Oromia, it is structurally incongruent and 
constitutionally nonsensical to demand the State of Oromia to join hands with 
Addis Ababa/Finfinnee for joint administration. Instead, there has to be an 
analogous city administration directly responsible to the State of Oromia and could 
shoulder with Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration. Besides, for the State 
of Oromia to ensure its “special interest” in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee – and above 
all, to say that it has a capital city – it should establish an equivalent body that can 
safeguard the interests of all Oromo in general, and those who live in Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee in particular. Furthermore, the fact that there are already 
established special zones surrounding Addis Ababa/Finfinnee calls for a pragmatic 
policy that leverages the State of Oromia to proactively engage and garner the 
latter under the umbrella of an autonomous City Administration. This point is 
further discussed under the section dealing with two-city administration solution. 
 
Old Delhi and New Delhi: Example of Two-city Administration? 
Before picking India to draw a lesson from and to supplement the two-city 
administration proposal, this author has assessed some federal countries´ capital 
cities ranging from U.S. to Switzerland and from Nigeria to India.  
The author found that the case of India is more relevant than others for the 
following reasons. Like Ethiopia, India is a multicultural country; and like Oromia, 
Delhi, a state, hosts the federal and international institutions. As New Delhi is part 
and parcel of Delhi, so is Addis Ababa/Finfinnee for Oromia. However, unlike the 
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State of Oromia, the Delhi government is not a guest in New Delhi; instead, Delhi 
exercises both autonomous and shared authority with the Government of India.  
Delhi has an area of 1,483 sq. km.
22
 Delhi possesses agriculturally fertile land, 
and the biggest market for agricultural as well as other fungible goods. Although 
many people think that New Delhi and Delhi are the same, they are actually two 
distinct entities. In Delhi there are two entirely different cities: an old Delhi which 
was the capital in the period of Islamic rule, and New Delhi, built by the British. 
New Delhi was designed as the capital of India in the early 20
th
 century as part of 
shifting the capital of the British Empire from Kolkata to Delhi. Following India´s 
independence in 1947, New Delhi, which is to the South of old Delhi, remained the 
political capital of India. Delhi is a state and it has a governor. The federal 
Government of India and the government of Delhi administer New Delhi jointly. 
Although New Delhi is the seat of the government of India and a territory in Delhi, 
it is hard to draw a boundary between Delhi and New Delhi. However, the 
distinction exists between the two as New Delhi is a capital city hosting the 




Literature indicates that Delhi was a single district National Capital Territory 
(NCT) until the mid-90s (Delhi Development Report 2009; Varshney, 1998). 
However, following the constitutional change in the early 1990s, the NCT was 
divided into nine districts and 27 sub-districts, and an equal number of tehsils 
(Ibid). Furthermore, following the 1991 NCT of Delhi Act Article 239 AA, the 
Delhi Transport Corporation was transferred from the Central Government to the 
Delhi government, and the Delhi Electricity Supply Undertaking and Delhi Water 
Supply and Sewage Disposal Undertaking have been transferred from Municipal 
Capital of Delhi to the Delhi Government (Ibid). Whereas, Delhi Metro Rail 
Corporation is a joint venture of the state-central government with the government 
of Delhi, and the central government has an upper hand in matters related to its 
governance (Ibid). It is also interesting to note that, whereas the development and 
management of land in Delhi is primarily with the Delhi Development Authority; 
                                                          
22 Delhi is located in northern India between the latitudes of 28°-24’-17” and 28°-53’-00” 
North and longitudes of 76°-50’-24” and 77°-20’-37” East (Delhi Development Report, 
2009). 
23
See: Difference Between Delhi and New Delhi| Difference Between http://www.differenc
ebetween.net/miscellaneous/difference-between-delhi-and-new-delhi/#ixzz53ZlcvvDE 
(Accessed on May 17, 2017).  
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in New Delhi, the land belongs to Land and Estate department of the central 
government. In the New Delhi, the Law and order, and Police Administration are 
also under the central government.  
For the purpose of civic administration, Delhi is divided into three 
autonomous distinct areas: the Delhi Municipal Corporation (known as DMC), the 
New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC), and the Delhi Cantonment Board 
(DCB) (Ibid). The DMC and NDMC are given the power to raise revenue by 
imposing property taxes, taxes on vehicles and animals, theatre taxes, taxes on 
advertisements other than those published in the newspapers, and duties on the 
transfer of property (Ibid: 64). The area falling within the jurisdiction of DCB and 
the NDMC is 43 and 42.73 square kilometres respectively. The rest of the National 
Capital Territory is covered by the MCD, which includes the rural areas. In terms 
of the constituting seats, the MCD members are elected councillors ranging from 
80 and 134 to the maximum. In contrast, the NDMC is a body of eleven members, 
all nominated by the Central government. The Chairperson is a serving officer of 
the Government having the rank of Joint Secretary of the Government of India or 
above (Ibid). All the three municipal corporations have Mayors, Deputy Mayors, 
Chairman Standing Committees and Chairman for the committees formed for 
wards and other issues (Ibid: 7). 
 
A Blueprint towards Twin-city Administration 
Addis Ababa/Finfinnee is the home of diverse ethnic groups,
 
the seat of 
international organizations, the seat of the federal government and the capital of 
the State of Oromia, at least in principle.
24
 Following Bangkok (capital of 
                                                          
24
 In fact, in the last century the population of Addis Ababa/Finfinnee grew exponentially. 
For instance, 2010 the total population was 65,000 in 1910, 100,000 in 1935, 443,728 in 
1961, and 1,423,111 in 1984 and   in 2015 it reached 3,194,000.   Equally, in 1935 the 
geographic size of Addis Ababa/Finfinnee was 21, 8000 ha, in 1986 it grew to 53,014, in 
1996 it become 54,000. Today, Addis Ababa/Finfinnee is eleven times larger than Adama 
city, the second largest city in Ethiopia. In addition, Addis Ababa has the “highest 
concentration of basic service facilities per population” (Zelalem Kibret,  2015). Currently, 
the total population residing in Addis Ababa is estimated to be 2.7 million (World 
Population Review, 2017). However, other sources estimate the population in Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee to be seven million.  
See: http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia-population/cities/(Accessed on 
July 17, 2017). In Ethiopia, only 19% of the population live in urban and the rest (81%) 
live in rural area. 
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Thailand) and Lima (capital of Peru), it is the third largest primate city in the world 
(Zelalem Kibret, 2015). Experiences of the South East Asian countries and most 
federal states in the world, primate cities are eliminated in favour of secondary 
city. Contrary to this, Addis Ababa/Finfinnee remained the primate as well as 
secondary city in Ethiopia (Ibid). 
This trend has never been questioned and/or reversed. For instance, Article 5 
of the Revised Addis Ababa City Charter reads that the boundaries of Addis Ababa 
City may either be settled based on the consensus of the Addis Ababa City Council 
and the State of Oromia, or by the Federal Government. The provision appears to 
be an intended loophole for encroachment on the territory of the State of Oromia. 
The fact that the administration of Addis Ababa/Finfinnee was made solely 
responsible to the Federal government (see: Article 49 (3)) has further crippled the 
State of Oromia from taking any significant action to contain the Federal 




To address these challenges, this paper proposes a two-city administration. 
Suppose that a proclamation entailing aforesaid issues and the special interest of 
the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa is enacted. The question is how such a 
proclamation could be enforced in the absence of an autonomous city 
administration responsible to the State of Oromia? This paper strongly advocates 
for the establishment of twin city system where Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Administration is answerable to the Oromia Regional State and Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration is answerable to the Federal government. 
The territorial jurisdiction of the former may encompass all Special Zones 
surrounding Addis Ababa/Finfinnee: Burayu, Dukem, Gelan, Holeta, Lege Tafo, 
Sendafa, Sebeta, and Sululta.
26
 
                                                          
25
Whenever the people invoke their constitutional rights and demand just treatment as per 
the Constitutional framework – the government labels such quest as either “anti-
development”, “anti-peace” or as sympathizers with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), 
which the EPRDF used to regard it as terrorist organization. However, due to political 
change in Ethiopia, all political organizations, both armed and unarmed, are relieved of 
being regarded as terrorists.   
26
Regulation No.115/2000, Regulation issued to Establish the Special Zone of Oromia 
Around Finfine, Magalata Oromia, Finfine, August 2000. 
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Where the dwellers from different walks of life in the Addis Ababa/Finfinnee, 
may be seen in light of the Bourdieu’s “transformation of the forms of capital in 
sub-fields” (Bourdieu, 1993 quoted in Varli-Görk, 2014); the claim of the Oromo 
people living in the city signifies the “struggles … to realize their material interests 
in the city (Logan and Molotch 1987 quoted in Varli-Görk, Reyhan. 2014). The 
claim of the Oromos in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee city might fit into the production of 
“separate urban space” (Purcell, 2002 and Isin, 2000 quoted in Varli-Görk, 2014: 
139). In other words, it is the claim for the construction of “new relations” 
divorced from the old polity (Lefebvre, 1991 quoted in Varli-Görk, 2014: 145). In 
our case, the rationale of proposing the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Administration signifies the development of new “physical/perceived space”, i.e. 
“objective reality” while the special interest of the State of Oromia in the old 
polity, i.e. Addis Ababa/Finfinnee, can still be treated as “mental/conceived 
space”, i.e. “subjective reality” as well as “social/lived space”, i.e. “actual reality” 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 12; Varli- Görk, 2014: 148). 
At face value, this suggestion may appear shallow. However, this strategy 
would allow the State of Oromia to encircle Addis Ababa/Finfinnee and thus deter 
its limitless encroachment.  Moreover, as the special zones contain numerous 
industries and development projects, there is a possibility that Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee will dissect into political and economic centres. In other words, 
the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration would become an economic 
capital, whereas Addis Ababa/Finfinnee would remain a political capital. 
It has to be noted that, in the absence of an equivalent body such as the 
Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration, to aim for a joint administration (see 
Article 49(5) of FDRE Constitution) is contrary to a federal arrangement. In other 
words, for a joint administration to exist, ab initio, there should be two separate but 
congruent organs. Once the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration is 
established, it should become directly accountable to the state of Oromia. In other 
words, on behalf of the State of Oromia, Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Administration would deal with the Federal government on matters concerning the 
special interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa. Where the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Administration and the Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration work jointly 
on matters that are common; and they act independent on matters specific to both  
of  them. Thus, a joint administration could be established on matters that are 
shared -- for example, on matters such as the usage of natural resources, waste 
management, and environmental protection. On the other hand, the Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration would not interfere in the affairs of the 
Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration when it comes to the preservation and 
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promotion of the culture, language, history, education, health, and other social 
services in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa. Likewise, the latter should not interfere into 
exclusive affairs of the Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration. Nevertheless, 
both should have the concurrent power of levying and collection of taxes (Article 
98 and 99 of FDRE Constitution).  
It is important to elaborate how self-rule and shared rule could work in twin-
city system. First and foremost, the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration 
headquarters must be established in Addis Ababa. This signifies the “conceived 
reality” – mirroring the symbolic significance of Finfinnee/Addis Ababa for the 
State of Oromia. Second, it should be noted that the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Administration represents all Oromos living in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa and 
beyond. As such, any Oromo who lives in any sub-city would seek social services 
from the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration – and the latter is duty bound 
to deliver them. All Oromo people who live under the jurisdiction of Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration may receive social services that were 
provided and managed by the latter; whereas, the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Administration would oversee if their constitutional right is safeguarded. Third, 
respective city administrations should have city councils with the power and 
responsibility to review and approve the annual budget, oversee the performance of the 
local public employees, borrow funds, modify the city's charter, exercise the power of 
eminent domain,
27
 and communicate policies and programs to residents and others
28
 
(Fromont, 1978 quoted in Azuela and Herrera-Martín, 2009: 7). 
The relationship between the Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration and 
the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration can be framed as autonomous but 
interdependent “legal persons” – established with distinguished purposes. As legal 
persons, they would have powers, functions, and capitals. The budgets allocated to 
each administration depends on the scope of social services to be provided, and 
should be guided by the principle of “subsidiarity” (Endo, 1998). As legal persons, 
among others, they shall exercise juridical powers attributed to them by the law. In 
particular, the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration would issue and 
implement policies concerning the development of the city; constitute the 
                                                          
27
It is important to note here that there could be no urban policies without the acquisition 
and control of land by public authorities. 
28
 See also Council Functions http://www.nlc.org/city-councils (Accessed on June 26, 
2017). 
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executive body of the City Government and establish public enterprises, as legal 
entities, on its own or in partnership, as per applicable laws, with the private sector 
or other third parties. It would organize Sub-Cities and Kebeles, demarcate their 
borders and allocate budgetary subsidy to them; administer, according to law, the 
land and the natural resources located within the bounds of the City; and prepare, 
approve and administer the budget of the City. It would determine and collect, 
according to law, taxes, duties and service charges out of the sources of income. 
Finally, under authorization by the state of Oromia, the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa 
City Administration could borrow money from third bodies; establish co-operation 
agreements with Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration, federal government 
and regional government organs, the private sector, non-governmental 
organizations, and various international organizations.
29
 
The Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration would have a city council 
that would constitute the executive organs of the City, approve the budget of the 
City Government, issue the Master plan of the City, elect, from among its 
members, the City Mayor and Deputy Mayor, approve the appointment of 
members of the City Cabinet upon the recommendation of the Mayor, approve, the 
appointment of the President, Vice President and judges of the City Courts and of 
the Chief Auditor; and establish the Judicial Administration Commission and 
designate its members.
30
In turn, the Mayor of the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Administration, being accountable to the City Council and the Government of 
Oromia, would be the Chief Executive Officer of the City. 
Most importantly, the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration would 
generate revenue through taxes, fees, rentals, royalties, etcetera and through joint 
investment, fund investment, and donations. It could borrow from domestic 
sources, directly or by selling bonds. It could establish a Savings and Development 
Bank in partnership with governmental and non-governmental organizations. 




                                                          
29
 See: Article 11 of Proclamation No.361/2003, Addis Ababa City Government Revised 
Charter, Federal Negarit Gazeta, 9th Year No.86, Addis Ababa.  
30
 See also: Article 12 of Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Proclamation No. 
361/2003. 
31
 See also: Article 53ff of Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter Proclamation 
No. 361/2003. 
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Last but not the least, it comes to the security and justice system, the 
Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration, as a component part of the State of 
Oromia, would be accountable to the State Government. The Government of 
Oromia would have the power to dissolve the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Administration and to constitute a transitional administration, as per the decision 
of the Caffee, where an act endangering the state constitution is committed by the 
Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration Councillors, where it fails to manage 
security matters and emergency situations.
32 
 
Concluding Remarks  
This paper discussed that Addis Ababa/Finfinnee is a nucleus of political fever in 
Ethiopia. It evaluates the historical injustice and the recent past displacement of the 
Oromo people in and surrounding of Addis Ababa/Finfinnee in the name of 
“development”; and discussed the widespread discontents in relation to land rights 
in general and Oromia Regional State´s constitutional rights in its Capital city in 
particular. As stated elsewhere, although the State of Oromia has “special interest” 
in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee, in effect, this constitutional provision was kept merely a 
promissory note. Perhaps, it is only when mass protests from the people take place 
that it gains some momentum. Most of the time, under the TPLF-led EPRDF, the 
pressure from the public is often appeased through political manoeuvres and 
government brutalities.  
Under Article 49 (5) of FDRE Constitution, although what constitutes the 
“special interest” is broadly stated, its details are neither defined nor enacted into 
law. In fact, this paper does not object a legislation that would safeguard the 
interest of Oromia in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee. Rather, a fortiori, it proposes a 
structural adjustment from the side of the State of Oromia. That is, devising an 
autonomous Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City Administration responsible to the State 
of Oromia, which can ensure the special interest of the latter in Addis 
Ababa/Finfinnee and ultimately constituting twin-city system. Through such a 
strategic and legitimate move the unjust historical relations between the central 
government and the Oromo people could be rectified. In addition, it may change 
the prey-predatory relationship into a relationship of mutual interdependence. 
Moreover, establishing such congruent and equivalent body allows it to delineate 
the uncontrolled elasticity of the capital city and defends the unjust eviction of the 
                                                          
32
 See also Article 61 and ff of Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter 
Proclamation No.  361/2003 
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Oromo community surrounding Addis Ababa. By doing so, the State of Oromia 
ensures its constitutional right to self-rule. Furthermore, this mechanism 
decentralizes power and allows co-management between the federal government 
and the State of Oromia.  
Last but not the least, for the implementation of such a proposal, the author is 
of the opinion that there should be deliberative forums, public discussions and 
stakeholders feedbacks on its relevance, efficacy as well as sustainability. 
Especially, the mayors of Finfinnee Special Zones, Oromia Regional State, the 
Federal Government and Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City government should 
deliberate over the powers and functions Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
administration vis-à-vis Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City Administration. Finally, 
where the Caffee enacts a proclamation founding the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa City 
Government capable of producing its own charter; Addis Ababa/Finfinnee City 
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